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ABSTRACT
Pervasive systems are almost omnipresent in their collection and
processing of personal data. Understandingwhat these systems are
doing is essential for trust, and to ensure that data being collected
are accurate. Auditing these systems can help to determine the ac-
curacy of these data. Such audit may take place internally by sys-
tems designers, but external audit is important for accountability.
In this paper we explore whether users can conduct their own
external audit of the systems with which they interact. In partic-
ular, we use the Right to Data Portability afforded to data sub-
jects through the General Data Protection Regulation. Using fit-
ness trackers, we collect and upload running data to a set of data
controllers. By using data portability to then obtain a copy of our
data, we compare the data held by the controllers with our ground-
truth data. We find some inaccuracies in the data, but also that
audit can be impeded by insufficient explanations from data con-
trollers.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Applied computing→ Law; • Social and professional topics
→ Technology audits; • Hardware → Sensor applications and
deployments.
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Pervasive computing has arrived: sensors, actuators and applica-
tions and devices using these are commonplace, collecting and pro-
cessing data with or without the knowledge of those who are gen-
erating the data. Understandingwhat data are collected andwhether
those data are accurate is crucial for instilling trust in these sys-
tems. In other words, we need to be able to audit these systems.
In this paper we explore the use of the Right to Data Portability
(RtDP), provided to data subjects as part of the EU General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), to seewhether it can be used to help
audit pervasive computing systems.The RtDP allows data subjects
to obtain their personal data in a machine-readable format. In par-
ticular, we examine the use case of a wearable fitness tracker. Using
a tracker to collect fitness data locally to provide ground-truth data,
we upload data to a variety of fitness-tracking services.We then ex-
ercise the RtDP to obtain the data that these services believe that
they hold about us, and compare these data to our original ground-
truth data.
We find that in many cases, we are able to use our RtDP re-
quests to determine the accuracy of the data held, and find that
some data are inaccurate. In other cases, we cannot successfully
audit, because of insufficient data returned by the controllers (in
one case, no data at all), or insufficient metadata or explanation
to allow us to interpret the data. This raises interesting questions
both for the use of data rights in general, but also for further study
into the use of rights for auditing systems.
This paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 outlines background
and relevant related work in both law and computer science. Sec-
tion 3 describes the study, and we highlight some interesting re-
sults in Section 4. Finally in Section 5 we discuss implications of
our findings and future directions.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
The auditing of algorithmic decision-making systems and other
large-scale data collection mechanisms is increasingly recognised
as an important means of accountability in such systems. Bandy
surveys 62 studies where external agents audit public systems in
order to provide public accountability [4]. Among the suggestions
for future work is the need to establish baselines andmetrics. Tools
have also been created for the internal audit of systems by the sys-
tem designers themselves [16].
Our study employs data subject rights, which are increasingly
recognised as a research method [3], as a tool to obtain and au-
dit data held by data controllers. Article 20 of the GDPR provides
data subjects with the right to data portability: data subjects have
UbiComp-ISWC ’21 Adjunct, September 21–26, 2021, Virtual, USA Zoe Zwiebelmann and Tristan Henderson
the right to receive personal data that they have provided to a con-
troller, in a “structured, commonly used and machine-readable for-
mat” (Article 20(1) [9]). As the only new data subject right in the
GDPR, Article 20 has been the subject of several empirical studies.
Wong and Henderson make portability requests to 230 controllers
and find variation in their ability to conform with the right’s re-
quirements [21]. Syrmoudis et al. [19] look at 182 controllers to
specifically study the ability to exercise Article 20(2) — the right to
port data from one controller to another. In a smaller-scale study,
Li compares a set of portability requests with another right, the
right to erasure [13]. Two recent studies are most similar to our
work in that they focus on the Internet of Things [5, 20] — their
aim, however, is more on examining whether portability can be
exercised, rather than the accuracy of the data that we study here.
We choose to focus on fitness trackers, which are commonly as-
sociated with self-tracking or the quantified self [18]. Lupton [14]
situates the quantified self in “audit culture”, whereby technolo-
gies such as the fitness trackers studied in this paper can be used
by institutions for surveillance and accountability of individuals,
but can also be used by individuals for their own self-audit. Our
work attempts to operationalise this self-audit. Schreiber [17] pro-
poses a model for checking the provenance of quantified self data.
Provenance in this model is concerned with what data were gener-
ated, which activities generated the data, and which parties were
involved or have access to the data. Accuracy is not considered.
Audit and the GDPR have also been studied elsewhere, e.g. Ar-
felt et al’s system for data controllers to automatically audit their
compliance with the GDPR [1]. While some data subject rights
such as Article 15 (right to access) are formalised and audited in
this system, Article 20 is not.
3 METHODOLOGY
Fitness trackers and services pervasively collect vast amounts and
various types of personal and sensitive data [10]. As such they pro-
vided an interesting case study for exercising the RtDP. Our study’s
methodology can be split into: data collection and storage; data
transmission; exercising of rights; and data analysis.
To collect data, we used an Amazfit Bip fitness tracker, and con-
nected this to the open-source application Gadgetbridge running
on a Samsung Galaxy A20e Android phone. Gadgetbridge allows
the use of a selected number of fitness tracking devices without
the vendor’s closed source application, thus eliminating the need
to create an account and transmitting personal data to the vendor’s
server [11]. This allowed us to collect GPS files from the Amazfit
Bip after running sessions, and store these locally in a NoSQL data-
base to keep as ground-truth data.
To transmit data to data controllers, we first chose an appropri-
ate set of service providers based on popularity (Table 1). All apps
selected for assessment offered tracking of basic running metrics
such as pace, heart rate, burned calories, and distance. We signed
up for each service using a fake profile that was similar but not
identical to one of the authors. Most service providers required the
submission of personal data such as gender, date of birth, height
and weight (justifying this, for instance, with the need to accu-
rately calculate the number of calories burned during a run).
Table 1: Popular Running Apps (State: June 2020) [12]
App Company Play Store Downloads
Adidas Running by Runtastic Adidas 50m+
Strava Strava 10m+
MapMyRun Under Armour 10m+
Endomondo UnderArmour 10m+
Nike Run Club Nike 10m+
Runkeeper ASICS 10m+
Komoot komoot 5m+
Table 2: Data Collection Details
Collection Start Date 5th May 2020
Collection End Date 2nd July 2020
Number of Runs 39
Number of Towns 3
Minimum distance per run 2km
Maximum distance per run 15km
Table 3: Data Transmission Details
Data controller Transmission method
Adidas Running GPX import
Strava Amazfit app integration
MapMyRun GPX import onto web
Endomondo GPX import onto web
Nike Run Club None of the methods supported
Runkeeper GPX import onto web
Komoot GPX import into app
Amazfit Amazfit app integration
Having created accounts, we then carried out a number of runs
(Table 2) and recorded the data in Gadgetbridge.
Datawere submitted to the service providers in threeways: through
the device vendor, the Amazfit app, that was connected to the
Amazfit Bip fitness tracker; through GPX (GPS Exchange Format)
import functions on the service providers’ websites; or through
directly importing the raw GPX file from Gadgetbridge into the
Komoot app (Table 3). We selected one service provider (Nike Run
Club) as a destination for Article 20(2) transmissions since it could
not interact with our chosen Amazfit device, nor did it provide any
option to import raw GPX files. We uploaded data to the other six
chosen applications and to the device provider Amazfit.
To exercise the RtDP and obtain a copy of the uploaded data,
we examined the privacy notices for each service provider to find
contact details for the Data Protection Officer. We sent requests
via e-mail using a template (similar to Wong and Henderson [21])
to four providers (Adidas Running, Strava, Komoot, Amazfit) and
three providers (Endomondo, Runkeeper, MapMyRun) were con-
tacted using an online form. We asked both for a copy of our data
(as per Article 20(1)) and to port data to another controller (Article
20(2)).
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Table 4: Overview of file formats of responses sent by data
controllers.
Data Controller Description File Formats Files
Adidas Running YES JSON, GPX, JPG 279
Strava YES CSV, GPX, JPG 82
MapMyRun NO XLSX, CSV 2
Endomondo YES JSON, HTML, TCX, JPG 43
Runkeeper NO GPX, CSV 41
Amazfit NO CSV 6
Komoot N.A. N.A. N.A.
4 RESULTS
Article 12(3) states that data controllers shall provide information
in response to a request within one month, with potential exten-
sion of a further two months depending on the complexity and
number of the requests. Our seven data controllers respondedwithin
1 to 23 days. One controller replied to say that fulfilling the request
would take longer than one month, and eventually provided the
data after 32 days. Two controllers asked for further identity veri-
fication. After responding to the request, four controllers pointed
to an existing “Download my data” tool, while two sent data by
e-mail. One controller, Komoot, stated that they were unable to
provide any data at all, and did not provide further explanation.
Article 20(1) states that data controllers shall provide data in
a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format. Data
were returned in a variety of formats and number (Table 4). Data
were uploaded to controllers in GPX format, and some controllers
returned data in this same format. Endomondo returned the GPS
data in TCX format, while MapMyRun returned an Excel spread-
sheet containing GPS traces. The JPG files returned were those im-
ages that were uploaded during the submission of runs. Table 4
also shows that only half of the responses contained a description
of the dataset or any metadata. A lack of description and conver-
sion of formats between upload and download may hinder the use
of portability for audit.
We considered the accuracy of the data in three parts: the user
profile data, the running statistics and the GPS data. Only one data
controller returned all of the user profile data in a complete and
accurate state. Three controllers returned partial information (e.g.
missing date of birth, gender, or name). Two data controllers re-
turned inaccurate profile information (weight, height and date of
birth). All other profile data elements were returned accurately and
in the same format that were uploaded (excluding minor changes
such as date string formats such as 01.01.1996 being uploaded and
1996/01/01 being returned).
Running statistics (duration, distance, average pace, calories and
so forth) were calculated by the data controllers on the basis of the
submitted GPX files. Such processed or inferred data are excluded
from the right to data portability [2], but theywere returned by five
controllers (all apart from Endomondo and Komoot). We were able
to calculate these statistics using our ground-truth data and com-
pare. Table 5 shows that only one data controller provided com-
plete and accurate statistics. Completeness was measured by the
extent to which the data that was provided was returned by data
Table 5: Assessment of completeness and accuracy of re-
turned running statistics (starting time, distance, duration)
per run by data controller. The number of inaccurate runs
(out of a total of 39 runs) per statistic is indicated in the re-
spective column.
Data Controller Complete Accurate Time Distance Duration
Adidas Running YES NO 1 0 0
Strava YES NO 0 0 21
MapMyRun NO YES 0 0 0
Endomondo N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Runkeeper YES YES 0 0 0
Amazfit YES NO 0 39 39
Komoot N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Table 6: Number of data points in each GPS-data set, further
separated into total number of track points (TP), geoloca-
tion, elevation, time, and heart rate data.
Source Total TP Geolocation Elevation Time HR
Raw Data 95,037 95,037 95,037 95,037 94,666
Adidas Run-
ning
95,037 95,037 95,037 95,037 94,669
Strava 100,393 94,146 93,223 100,393 43,654
MapMyRun N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Endomondo 95,037 95,037 95,037 95,037 95,037
Runkeeper 95,037 95,037 95,037 95,037 0
Amazfit N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Komoot N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
controllers, and accuracy was measured by the extent to which the
returned datawere correct and coincidedwith the transmitted data.
We saw that Strava’s duration measure was wrong for more than
half of the submitted runs. Amazfit returned data in metrics that
we could not understand (e.g. distance = 1.6649797 for a 10km run,
average pace = 218) and no information was provided on how to
convert these.
The GPX data provided to each controller included location data
(latitude, longitude, elevation) recorded periodically in track points
(TP), and heart rate (HR) data. Such health data are sensitive (spe-
cial category under the GDPR) and with potential uses such as in-
surance, their accuracy is of importance. Four out of the seven data
controllers returned GPS data for each of the 39 runs (Table 6). The
disparity between HR and TP can be explained by the fact that
heart rate was notmeasured at the beginning of each run.Themost
interesting disparities are between Strava and the raw data. Closer
examination of the data showed that Strava structures its data into
TPs occurring every two seconds of a run, while the uploaded data
contained TPs every three to four seconds. Interpolation appears
to have led to an increased number of TPs, and yet fewer points
for elevation and HR.
We further examined the HR data since this is health and more
sensitive. Table 6 shows that Runkeeper failed to return the HR
data with the GPS traces. Instead it provided average HR per run;
we were able to calculate these averages from our ground-truth
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data and they were all accurate. Adidas and Endomondo provided
differing numbers of HR points to the raw data. Some of these ap-
pear to be errors (e.g. 368 Adidas TPs had no HR data yet 263 of
these did have HR data in the upload). Endomondo appears to have
interpolated the HR data to make up for the missing number of
points compared to TP. Strava’s differing TP structure made it dif-
ficult to directly compare with our ground-truth. Instead we used
a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to compare the distribu-
tions of the two datasets - these showed a significant difference
(p < 0.01).
Finally, out of the six data controllers, only one respected the
Article 20(2) request to port the data to another data controller.
Unfortunately the latter data controller, Nike RunClub, interpreted
the incoming transmission as an Article 17 (erasure) request and
asked for confirmation that the data subject wished to have all of
their data erased. This reiterates the findings of others [19, 20] that
Article 20(2) is not widely understood.
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper we have presented an initial exploration into the use
of subject access rights for auditing systems. We have shown that
data portability, when combined with local collection of ground-
truth data, can act as an instrument for understanding the accu-
racy of the data held by data controllers. We find that we were
able to highlight inaccuracies in the data held by data controllers,
but also that insufficient descriptions and metadata provided by
data controllers might impede our ability to audit. In one case, the
complete lack of data returned by a controller made it impossible
to audit. Differing formats, and differing ways in which the data
were interpreted by data controllers, also raise challenges to audit.
This study raises many additional possible avenues for future
work. One question is whether other rights could also help to au-
dit. Article 15 (the right to access) is more expansive than Article
20, but also introduces potential problems in that requests do not
have to be fulfilled in a machine-readable format. For simplicity,
therefore, we focused on Article 20 in this study. Article 16 (the
right to rectification) or Article 17 (the right to erasure) could be
used to correct inaccurate data, such as those that we found for
user profiles. One could imagine an ongoing monitoring loop of
Article 20 requests to check data followed by Article 16 to correct
data, although the GDPR also places limitations on the number
of requests that can be made (Article 12(5)’s conditions for “man-
ifestly unfounded or excessive” requests). Even without these re-
strictions, the 32-day response time by one controller would make
such a loop challenging.
We have examined a portability request from a single data sub-
ject. This only provides one viewpoint into the system being au-
dited. We aim to explore tools for crowdsourcing and aggregating
these individual self-audits, thus extending from a single citizen’s
audit to a societal audit. Note that “it is important to acknowledge
that the rights under Regulation (EU) 2016/679 can only be exer-
cised by each individual and cannot be conferred or delegated to
a data cooperative” [8], so we envisage such crowdsourcing as be-
ing made up of individual requests carried out by individual data
subjects, which could then later be aggregated. This could build on
Mahieu and Ausloos’ [15] concept of the ecology of transparency
to create collective empowerment, thus re-balancing the power be-
tween data subjects and controllers.
While this initial study is small, it does indicate some limitations
to this approach. We were forced to use three different methods
of uploading data to our chosen service providers, which poten-
tially creates inconsistency. This was due to technical constraints:
Amazfit, Strava and Komoot did not allow us to import raw GPX
files from Gadgetbridge. To upload data to Strava we had to use
the Amazfit integration, and this may have led to preprocessing by
Amazfit before transmission (e.g. rounding). Exploring solutions to
overcoming these limitations, by collecting more data in this sec-
tor (fitness) but also exploring other sectors, is another challenge
for future work.
Finally, going beyond the GDPR, there are indications that the
right to data portability may become more widely applied, e.g. for
interoperability [6]. Gatekeepers will have obligations to “provide
effective portability of data generated through the activity of a
business user or end user” in the forthcoming EU Digital Markets
Act [7]. So our methods may be able to be applied elsewhere.
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